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Rogers Brubaker
Introductory remarks
Grounds for Difference was not conceived or written as a monograph. The 
essays were written at different times. The two long pieces at the beginning 
of the book (“Difference and Inequality” and “The Return of Biology”) were 
written last and were not previously published.  Indeed they were too long 
to publish as journal articles. (The maximum length of journal articles, alas, 
keeps shrinking, even in an age of electronic publication. Articles of more 
than 10,000 or 12,000 words are increasingly difficult to place. I essentially 
found myself having to write a book in order to publish these longer essays.)
The essays collected in the book treat themes that have preoccupied me for 
some time, including the transnational and global dimensions of ethnicity 
and nationalism, addressed in the final three chapters. But they also reflect 
new directions in my work. In the Introduction I characterize the new direc-
tions as engaging three increasingly salient contexts for the contemporary 
politics of difference: the return of inequality, the return of biology, and the 
return of the sacred. Let me say a few words about each of these.
Obviously, equality never disappeared as a theme in social-scientific re-
search. However, inequality has been approached in different ways in re-
cent decades, and ways that have been tied to the increasing concern with 
the politics of identity and difference. As a result of this broad shift in polit-
ical and intellectual sensibility, there has been less concern with structural, 
political-economic forms of inequality. But in recent years there has been 
a striking “return of inequality” – and specifically of structural and polit-
ical-economic forms of inequality – in public discussion and in scholarly 
work. The fact that Piketty became a best-seller is just one indicator of this. 
This is the sense in which one can speak of a return of inequality. 
Something similar can be said about the return of biology. Biological ways 
of making sense of sameness and difference never disappeared, of course. 
But discussions of race and ethnicity in the social sciences in the second half 
of the 20th century focused increasingly on cultural ways of understanding 
human difference. Yet in the aftermath of the human genome project, we 
see a return of the language of biology, and more specifically genetics, in 
social-scientific discussions of race and ethnicity. This new objectivism or 
naturalism about race also informs biomedical research, ancestry testing, fo-
rensic investigations, and political claims-making. I wanted to make sense 
of this multifaceted return of biology, not least because it seemed to pose a 
challenge to the constructivist theory of race and ethnicity that I and others 
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have been working with and developing. I wanted to find a way of respond-
ing to this challenge, without simply repeating the usual constructivist man-
tra that there are no biologically significant differences between socially de-
fined racial categories.  I wanted to defend a constructivist theory of race, 
while engaging rather than ignoring or dismissing recent developments in 
genetics. But the return of biology is not just a challenge to constructivist so-
cial science, it’s also an opportunity for constructivist social science. The new 
understandings of race, ethnicity, and ancestry that are in play in medical 
research, ancestry testing, forensics, and political claims-making provide a 
rich and interesting territory to analyse. So I attempted in this chapter to 
write a synthetic overview of recent discussions and developments in these 
domains of practice.
As for the return of the sacred: here too, of course, the sacred never went 
away. Yet again one can speak in a qualified way of a certain “return” of reli-
gion. The sociologist of religion José Casanova’s great book on Public Religion 
in the Modern World, for example, discussed the return of public, de-privat-
ized forms of religion in recent decades, reversing a longer-term trend to-
ward privatized, individualized, subjectivized forms of religion in the West. 
So I use this phrase – the return of the sacred – to signal my own interest in 
the ways in which the politics of difference, or you could say the politics of 
multiculturalism, turns increasingly on matters of religion in Europe and 
North America. This is indeed a new development in the last twenty five or 
thirty years. 
So these are the “three returns” that I use as an organizing device. But I 
wouldn’t want to insist too much on this trope: it serves primarily to mark 
out a set of emerging interests in my own work that led me to bring togeth-
er the pieces in this book.
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Ljubica Spaskovska
I would like to pick up on Professor Brubaker’s notion of regimes of inequal-
ity. My research is primarily historical, I work on a research project on the 
dissolution of state socialism in a global perspective. I’ve been primarily 
looking at the debates in the UN and especially at the UN Trade and Devel-
opment Forums for developing countries, where Yugoslavia was one of the 
key players, such as the ‘Group of 77 developing countries’, and especially the 
shifts which took place in the IMF and World Bank and the language of de-
velopment in the 1970s and 80s with the growth of the debt crisis. So I think 
that Professor Brubaker’s implication that citizenship shapes life chances on 
the global stage rings particularly true in this case, and of course hierarchies 
and regimes of inequality can have both global and domestic repercussions, 
but just thinking about the North-South divide and this asymmetry which 
is still there, especially the prehistory of today’s North-South in the 1970s 
and 80s when the developing countries of the South were trying to argue for 
a different approach to development compared to the industrialized North. 
Nevertheless, I’m working on a paper of the IMF and World Bank annu-
al meeting which took place in 1979 in Belgrade, where countries such as 
Mexico and Yugoslavia argued that we have to tackle the debt crisis and the 
conditionality imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, while the director 
of the World Bank was arguing that actually the problem that we have on 
the global scale is overpopulation, not conditionality and debt.
So I think that, looking at the root of this debate about global inequalities 
and hierarchies, it really has its prehistory long before the 2000s and before 
the intellectual community decided to think about inequality. I’ve also been 
looking at human development indexes, and interestingly enough, the call 
from some circles to dethrone growth as an indicator of development. So 
growth alone is not a guarantee for human development. If we look at the 
historical trajectory of human development, where, for example, the social-
ist Yugoslavia was in the 1990, and where the countries in the region are to-
day. Both human development and the GINI coefficient index, which is the 
primary indicator for income inequality, have increased of course. However, 
human development, mostly understood as fair opportunities, redistribution, 
decent standard of living – which the book very well pinpoints as important 
and connected to all sorts of other social differentiations such as race and 
religion and gender – in this region, in a post-socialist regime of inequali-
ty, these indicators of human development have decreased. Another issue I 
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would like to raise perhaps – the role of transnational corporations in this 
debate on global hierarchies. So, what was striking for us as a research team 
is that the UN Center for Transnational Corporations, which was set up in 
the 1970s to develop a code for behaviour for transnational corporations in 
developing countries was abolished in 1992. Some of the first countries to 
go to this UN center in the late 1980s, to seek advice on investment were 
China and Russia. So we see how in the 1980s this language of inequality 
and development basically shifts from countries which were pioneers of al-
ternative globalization or development. Perhaps Professor Brubaker could 
comment on how he sees, in the future, citizenship and especially global cit-
izenship developing and bridging the North-South divide.
Gëzim Krasniqi
I’m going to follow up on what Ljubica was saying about the relationship be-
tween citizenship, inequality and hierarchies that exist today in the world. I’ll 
basically look at how citizenship feeds on and sometimes even perpetrates 
inequality and hierarchies both at the level of the nation-states, as the main 
sites of political membership in the modern world, but also more widely in 
the modern world. I have a final point about one of the claims that Profes-
sor Brubaker makes in his book about the relationship between difference 
and inequality. Citizenship today is one of the key concepts, and Professor 
Brubaker has written extensively on that. Citizenship is about membership 
in a political community, and I think this is where the contention starts. It 
raises a number of questions: What kind of membership? Who has a right to 
be a member? What kind of polity we are speaking about? Are we speaking 
about smaller polities, states, nations, federations, or bigger unions such as 
the European Union? But I think, when we see how citizenship works on the 
smaller scale of a nation state, it is both unequal and hierarchical. It is un-
equal in the sense that it provides more access and opportunities and rights 
to some categories than others within the polity. We have citizens, we have 
regular migrants, but we also have the category of refugees or irregular mi-
grants who have a limited set of rights in a given polity.
Then, if you look at the different nation states, you will see that these prob-
lems are bigger in richer countries, but there is no necessary and clear rela-
tionship between economic well-being and the problems of unequal citizen-
ship in a nation state. I think that citizenship is inherently unequal because 
the very modern concept of the state is based on the principle of exclusion 
and some sort of selectivity. Whenever we speak about citizenship we speak 
about citizens and non-citizens, about us and them, about those who are in-
cluded and about others, until which point you have rights, and where your 
rights stop. And then you have other regimes which have other sets of rules 
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about who has the right to what. But I think that the problem is quite simi-
lar even at the global scale. We have a number of scholars who have spoken 
about that. Probably the most famous theory is Wallerstein’s world-system 
theory about the core, periphery and semi-periphery. I think this could also 
be used to explain how the regimes of citizenship work in the modern world. 
It is not the same thing to be a British and American citizen, or a citizen of 
Somalia, Afghanistan, or other poor countries which are undergoing con-
flicts. But there is also the work by Stephan Castels, whom I have used in 
my papers on citizenship hierarchies, that explores the correlation between 
economic well-being and the prestige and rights associated with different 
types of citizenship stemming from different kind of politics and different 
states. One clear example would be the World Passport Index. If you look 
at the value of passports, you will see that the countries at the top are the 
richest and most dominant countries in the world, and the countries at the 
bottom are the poorest and most isolated. That makes a huge difference at 
the global scale.
Finally, I think that one of the points that Professor Brubaker makes in his 
book is that the relationship between difference and inequality is contingent, 
not necessary. It is empirical, not conceptual. But if citizenship is essentially 
about categories and about inclusion and exclusion, does this somehow im-
ply that inequality is relational, not just empirical and conceptual, because 
citizenship is inherently about exclusion and inclusion? And the other ques-
tion that this raises would be: if we somehow manage to de-territorialize cit-
izenship, either through global citizenship, cosmopolitanism or stakeholder 
citizenship, would that avoid categorization and therefore reduce inequality 
and hierarchies that exist today in the modern world?
Tamara Petrović Trifunović
I would like to focus on another issue, more in the field of my research. It is 
connected to the first part of the book, the part on inequality. First of all, I 
would like to say that I highly appreciate the focus you put on the symbolic 
dimensions of inequality and how categories of difference produce and re-
produce inequalities. Because I believe that it is of great importance to study 
“processes that contribute to the production and reproduction of inequali-
ty through the routine and taken-for-granted actions of both dominant and 
subordinate actors”. This is in fact the quote of Michèle Lamont in a paper 
from 2014. In the same paper, the author says that the cultural processes are 
“a crucial missing link between cognitive processes and macro-level inequal-
ity”, which is a field that I’m really interested in. With that in mind, my first 
question would be: would you say that the very theme of the next year’s an-
nual meeting of the American Sociological Association, which is connected 
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to the understanding of the nexus of culture, inequalities and group bound-
aries, in some ways represents a culmination of already existing strong cur-
rents in contemporary US sociology, or should it be seen as a breaking point 
for cultural sociology and sociology in general in the US?
The second question is connected to this one: at the beginning of this chap-
ter you mention taste, as one of the dimensions on a horizontal plane, where 
people distinguish themselves from others according to the logic of differ-
ence. How would you, in this way, analyse the dimension of taste, or cultural 
consumption, cultural affiliations, level of cultural capital, and their role in 
the production and reproduction of inequality in the contemporary US so-
ciety? Would you take the cultural competence – this is just a term I use for 
this short discussion – into account according to the three general processes 
that you distinguish in the book, especially the first two which are the allo-
cation of persons to reward-bearing positions and the social production of 
unequally equipped categories of persons? Do you think that “cultural com-
petence” still plays a significant role in the production and reproduction of 
inequality, and in the reproduction of “forced immobility” (not in the same 
way as citizenship, of course), or has it lost its power, especially in the Unit-
ed States? Or maybe you think it has never played a significant role, because 
there are some specificities and contingencies in the US society. So, in short, 
how do, in your opinion, cultural differences contribute to both symbolic 
and socio-economic inequalities? Cultural – in the narrower sense.
Rogers Brubaker:
Response to Ljubica Spaskovska, Gëzim Krasniqi and Tamara Petrović 
Trifunović
Thank you for this initial set of very interesting comments. Since Ljubica and 
Gëzim both focused on citizenship and inequality,  let me speak to the issues 
that they raised first, and specifically to Gëzim’s questions about whether 
citizenship is inherently hierarchical, both at the level of the nation state, and 
more broadly. He very clearly set out some key notions about citizenship, 
which of course is inherently categorical, has an inside and outside, a bound-
ary; it is internally inclusive and externally exclusive. What I was trying to 
do by addressing citizenship as one nexus where difference and inequality 
intersect was to suggest that when we think about the exclusionary workings 
of citizenship, which everyone is aware of, we tend to think about those who 
are, as it were, visibly excluded. We tend to think in particular those who are 
within the territory of the state, but excluded from the privileges of citizen-
ship. In the US now, we have approximately 11 million undocumented im-
migrants, and when one thinks about citizenship, exclusion, and inequality 
in the American context, these are the people one thinks about first. There 
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has been very interesting sociological research done on undocumented mi-
grants.  This is not a single category: it is highly differentiated, and there are 
many respects in which undocumented persons do have some rights, even 
what might be called citizenship rights in some local contexts. But of course 
they lack very critical fundamental rights, and there is good ethnographic 
work showing how many undocumented people avoid all forms of contact 
with state agencies, particularly in parts of the US where local officials have 
not only the power, but indeed the obligation to tap into state-wide data-
bases and to report the presence of undocumented migrants. Since an en-
counter with a local official might lead to deportation, many people live in 
the shadows, avoiding institutions like hospitals and so on. 
This is all very clear. What is less clear, and less often discussed, is the invis-
ible exclusionary working of citizenship. This is what I wanted to highlight 
in my brief discussion of citizenship. That is, I wanted to talk not about the 
10 million people that are excluded from US citizenship and its protections 
while living in the territory of the US, but rather about the billions of people 
who are excluded from the citizenship of powerful, prosperous, relatively 
peaceful countries, because they can’t even become an undocumented im-
migrant. Of course, we didn’t need the refugee crisis of 2015 to tell us that 
nation states are not hermetically sealed, that no states can perfectly seal 
their borders. Nonetheless, even the nearly one million people who arrived 
in Germany last year comprise a very small fraction of the number of people 
who would like to have access to German territory, even for the uncertain 
status of being an asylum-seeker. This brings into sharp relief the powerful 
and still largely taken-for-granted exclusionary workings of citizenship on 
a global scale. It is this that I wanted to highlight. Despite the decline of legal 
categorical exclusion based on race, sex, religion and so on, legal categorical 
exclusion based on citizenship continues to be built into the architecture of 
the global state system. And it is so fundamental that it is hard to imagine 
a world without it. Of course large numbers of people cross state borders. 
But a far greater number would like to do so, yet are prevented from doing 
so because of their citizenship. 
Citizenships have radically different values. One indicator is indeed the price 
that people would pay for a “good” citizenship. Here’s where we may have 
a small disagreement – is the inequality between different citizenships in-
trinsic or somehow contingent? I see it as contingent, in the sense that one 
could imagine a world of bounded and exclusive citizenships that did not 
have radically different values.  If there weren’t major differences in life 
chances between countries, then the inequalities associated with bounded 
citizenship wouldn’t be so consequential. That is, you would still have exclu-
sive, bounded, closed citizenships, but they would not be arranged in a steep 
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hierarchy. As a matter of fact, of course, the world we live in is not like this; 
citizenships do differ massively in value. Ayelet Shachar’s book The Birthright 
Lottery, for example, describes citizenship as a valuable form of property that 
one inherits at birth in a morally arbitrary manner. And one can pass on this 
inherited property to one’s descendants.  
On the symbolic dimensions of inequality: Tamara, you quoted briefly from 
the work of Michèle Lamont. I see myself as engaged in a similar enterprise, 
and I presented an early version of this paper to Michèle’s cultural sociolo-
gy workshop. Both of us – and numerous others – are trying to connect, or 
reconnect, structural sources of inequality with the cultural dimensions of 
difference. Trying to reconnect these implies that scholarship had lost sight 
of this connection.  This I think was the case, but increasingly people like 
Michèle and my former colleague Andreas Wimmer are giving renewed at-
tention to the issue. One indicator of this is indeed the theme of next year’s 
ASA meetings. 
To your question about taste: I mentioned taste only in passing in this chap-
ter. I have elsewhere engaged the work of Pierre Bourdieu, who of course 
comes immediately to mind if one thinks of taste in connection with cultur-
al competences or cultural capital. And I have found Bourdieu’s work to be 
immensely fruitful. However, I don’t think one can simply take over what 
Bourdieu did in the French context and apply it in the American context. 
Bourdieu was writing about a landscape where the various forms of cultural 
capital were strongly hierarchized, a world in which high cultural forms had 
much greater prestige and value than pop-cultural forms. That is not the case 
in the US. There we see a pluralisation of taste worlds, even a de-hierarchi-
sation. Paul DiMaggio has done important and interesting historical work 
on this.  He shows how certain high cultural institutions were established 
around the beginning of the 20th century in many American cities. But by the 
end of the 20th century, the cultural consensus that sustained the connection 
between upper-class status and mastery of certain high cultural forms had 
vanished, and there is today no agreement about ranking of different forms 
of cultural competence. The world of taste is not as strongly hierarchized as 
a reading of Bourdieu would suggest.
Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc
I really enjoyed this book, because I was a little bit outside of the topic of 
identity and diversity for a few years, it was more a topic of my MA studies. 
In a way, it was a nice way to catch up with the field. I had the feeling, while 
reading, like there was an academic play-date: lots of new ideas and toys have 
been thrown up in the air, and then you tidied it up and organized it for us, 
or for somebody new entering the field, in order to get a general perspective 
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on the different ways and approaches how one can tackle these key issues 
related to diversity. For me personally this was more a book about the social 
organization of identity, because that is the perspective I was most interest-
ed in. Therefore, I was most drawn to the chapter on religion and national-
ism. Going through an overview of different approaches how one can tackle 
these very complex and multilayered topics, was a nice way to check myself 
– so this is what I did when I was writing my thesis. I was actually reminded 
of something you said during the thesis seminar in 2008, and it was a very 
passing remark, but something that really stayed with me. We were discuss-
ing about religiosity as a concept that somehow describes the variety, the 
continuum between lower and higher levels of religious attachment, feeling 
or identity. And you said “Yes, we need that kind of word for ethnic identity, 
something like ‘ethnocity’. And I remember writing it down – ‘ethnocity’”, I 
was thinking about it because this kind of identification can be very salient 
for someone’s identity, for the organization of the society, or it can be very 
marginal and less important for individuals or for the organization of society.
Therefore, when I was looking at this very nice mapping of different ap-
proaches to study of religion and nationalism I was wondering how this anal-
ysis of different approaches relates to the issue of gradation in religious or 
national identity, in the sense of higher/lower level of religiosity, or higher/
lower level of saliency of the ethnic identity for the organization of society. 
I am not thinking only at the individual level of personal identity but also 
at the social level, because this is one quality of the book – that it somehow 
connects the bottom-up and top-down approaches, that is, researching these 
issues from the perspective of society or individual. When talking about dif-
ferent levels of salience or gradation in intensity of feeling ethnic or religious 
identity, I was wondering how your book communicates with intersection-
ality as an approach of study which looks at different axes of identity – race, 
class, gender, ethnicity and so on, and how they interact and create systems 
of diversifications and systems of discrimination. Because your book is also 
organized along these different axes – you look at different dimensions of 
citizenship, gender, religion, nationalism, and you go deep into each one of 
them, but we all know that none of these lines of diversification work in-
dividually or on their own in society. They are always working in combi-
nation, they are always historically contingent. And as much as I have per-
sonally deep support and respect for intersectionality as an approach and I 
like to advocate it around, it was immensely hard for me to apply it in prac-
tice. When you’re conducting a research or writing a research project, you 
have this very abstract idea how you should do it, but it is very hard to put it 
into practice, because it becomes an equation with too many variables. And 
I was thinking – what do you think generally about intersectionality as an 
approach and how do you think the book relates to that concept?
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Viktor Koska
I was thinking about how to make an introduction about what I am going to 
ask professor Brubaker today, because he gave me probably key theoretical 
approach in analysing the extensively rich data on ethnicity and migration 
integration issues and different categories of citizens. How did I find about 
the work of Rogers Brubaker? It was late 2006 when I was doing my mas-
ters at Oxford University, where, as a young scholar at that time, I decided 
to explore what has never been explored in Croatia before, the experience of 
the Serb minority returnees in the small town of Glina. What I was expect-
ing was to see very clearly shaped entities of former refugees who are now 
returnees and who are obviously Serb ethnic minority. By that time I was 
also approaching what Professor Brubaker terms as the groupist approach. 
My difficulty was that, after conducting 30 interviews, I was approaching 
a groupist identity only at those times when I was imposing that on my re-
spondents, or when I was asking the question in which they were reflect-
ing not their personal experiences, but the experiences that they picked up 
somewhere else. This was happening after four or five hours of discussing 
what it meant to be an ethnic Serb in an environment which was expected 
to be extremely hostile, considering the ethnic cleansing. So I was in despair 
because I thought that I was going to fail my thesis, I don’t have a theoretical 
approach through which I can explain what was going on.
A friend of mine suggested to me your books about ethnicity without groups 
and Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town, and that 
book literally saved my academic career. So thank you very much for that. I 
would disagree with Jovana that this book cannot offer a venue how to explore 
ethnographic research. I actually think that this is the book that allows research-
ers to explain a very complex reality within ethnicity, how it works, and to clear-
ly see the areas within groupist approaches that have been institutionalized. In 
that case, I will just jump over to your newer book and the approaches that you 
developed in the fifth and sixth chapter, particularly on diaspora and member-
ship migration in the member states, especially because today we have the ref-
erendum in Republic of Srpska. This book is so important because it actually 
allows us to explain in analytical language what is going on beyond the politi-
cal discourse of everyday ethnicity which is always shaped in a groupist term.
In that case, I would like just to reflect briefly on the fact that, just as you 
said, diaspora is not an entity in the world, it is a stance toward the world. 
I would like to combine this with the analysis of a very particular Croatian 
case about how the external politics of inclusion have been shaped over the 
five or six years, and how they are sometimes aiming to include very com-
plex ideas of ethnicity, but then exclude them on the other side. For exam-
ple, if you take diaspora as the imagined groups of people who are having 
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their ancestry and descendants on a particular territory. In Croatia we have 
more than 400.000 people who were forced to leave the country – Serbs – 
in the 1990s, who are now settled in Serbia. On internal politics of belong-
ing, Croatia has enacted a set of policies by which it is denying the right to 
these people to keep their residency in Croatia, even if they are citizens. On 
the other hand, the new strategy for Croats abroad has completely excluded 
this category of possible diaspora. On the other hand we are also seeing that 
there are different categories of tackling diaspora in the Croatian strategy. 
There are very clear goals about what we want to have, and which is basical-
ly measured in the nation state and ethnic Croatians in reality. For example, 
Croatia is obviously not setting the same strategy for Croats in Bosnia-Her-
zegovina, because it wants to keep its sovereignty over that section of the 
population in Bosnia. It is also pushing off possible return of non-wanted 
ethnic Croats who might come back. Those are Croats from Vojvodina, from 
less developed areas, and it comes very clear – the Croats who are actual-
ly welcome to come back are those who are not Croats at all. They are dis-
covering their ethnicity where it does not exist. It is a similar situation with 
the Croatian national soccer team. The coach is going to Latin America and 
looking for talents and he is convincing them that they are Croats because 
of their ancestors. There is one model that I like to explain to my students 
which makes clear this differentiation and this challenging issue about how 
we are imagining even ethnic diaspora. For example, there is no question 
about that one particular individual who transgresses this idea of ethnic iden-
tity and turns to citizenship – this is Nikola Tesla, who is of Serb ethnicity, 
but he is considered to be Croat by the diaspora. But according to Croatian 
citizenship laws, the descendants of Nikola Tesla would not be eligible for 
Croatian citizenship. On the other hand, the descendants of Ante Pavelić, the 
notorious war criminal, would have the right to Croatian citizenship even if 
they didn’t speak the language, and had no knowledge about Croatia at all.
Jovo Bakić
Since the end of the 1990s, when I read Nationalism Reframed, Rogers Bru-
baker has been one of my sociological guides through the study of national-
ism and ethnicity. And it is a real pleasure to discuss some issues with such 
a scholar. As my students know very well, I introduced Brubaker’s triangle 
in order to explain relations between Croatia, as a nationalizing state, Serbs 
in Croatia as national minority, and external national homeland – Serbia. 
Brubaker’s triangle is an invaluable instrument, if one would try to explain 
historical circumstances and relations between both Serbia and Croatia, and 
Serbs and Croats. 
Regarding “the return of biology” – I just don’t want to talk about it be-
cause I do not have time to talk about it. I think that discussing the theme 
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of return of biology, especially from someone who is, like Rogers Brubaker, 
a constructivist, is something that we have needed. “Return of the sacred” – 
yes, it is; but late Anthony Smith dealt with this incomparably, and I would 
not repeat his arguments. Regarding “the return of inequality” – yes, I agree 
with almost all professor Brubaker wrote. However, I have an objection. I 
think that when you discussed the issue of inequality, and you dealt with 
Tilly’s durable inequalities, you criticized him following your colleague and 
one another intellectual guide of mine – Michael Mann. You quoted Michael 
Mann, when he criticized Robert Tilly, that Tilly missed the class. And Tilly 
missed to explain inequality in terms of social class although he is a kind of 
neo-Marxist. We both agree with it.
At the same time, you do the same. You just missed the class. And I think 
that class is also an external category together with citizenship, ethnicity or 
religion. That is why I just want to ask you that – why did you do it? Why 
don’t you involve the concept of the class? And you even mentioned it in your 
introductory word here, that capitalism is an important issue, that Thom-
as Piketty wrote about it insightfully, and I agree – but still, why don’t you 
connect the issue of class with citizenship, with race, with ethnicity? And in 
many ways, they are more often than not overlapping. You have discussed 
legal boundaries, and legal propositions that race meant something differ-
ent in the system of apartheid in South Africa. Today it is not legally codi-
fied. One could discuss the race issue in the USA as well. However, I want 
to stress especially lack of the class analysis in Grounds for Difference. I think 
that one has to take into consideration the class as a ground for difference. 
Workers were only half-citizens of a state, because many of them have no 
voting rights until the beginning of the 20th century. They have achieved 
thoroughly recognized citizenship rights only gradually and under pressure 
from organized workers’ movement. However, neither this legal equality 
means proper social equality for workers, nor legal equality means social 
equality for Afro-Americans. There are several boundaries that obstruct the 
progression of workers, and not to mention the precariat (a very interest-
ing category that appeared relatively recently). That is why I think that one 
should connect contemporary capitalism and the class in order to improve 
your otherwise excellent analysis.
Rogers Brubaker:
Response to Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc, Viktor Koska and Jovo Bakić
Again, a terrifically interesting set of comments. Let me be very quick and 
selective. I appreciate very much Jovana’s two questions. The first was about 
gradational rather than categorical differences. While differences of reli-
gion – i.e. of religious affiliation or membership – are generally understood 
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in categorical terms, differences of religiosity are understood in gradational 
terms: one can be more or less religious.  Jovana reminded me that I have 
the habit of remarking that we have no corresponding category for ethnicity. 
That is, we have ethnicity (like religion) as a categorical notion, but we do not 
have a term for “ethnosity” as a matter of degree that would correspond to 
religiosity. Yet such a notion would be useful, since in the study of ethnicity 
we would like to know – at least I would like to know – not only what some-
one’s ethnic affiliation or identity is, but how ethnic they are. Deeply ethnic? 
Or only occasionally and symbolically ethnic? Degrees of identification with 
any category not only vary among people; they also fluctuate overt time and 
context. This is what I meant in writing in earlier work about “groupness” 
as a variable, or in suggesting an “eventful” perspective on nationness as 
something that happens with particular force at particular times and places. 
About intersectionality, I struggle as you do with this notion. It is true that 
no category of difference works in the real world on its own. One is never 
just a woman; never just a Muslim; never just a member of a particular so-
cial class. All social determinations always act concomitantly and simultane-
ously.  But that poses a huge and indeed intractable analytic problem. Unless 
you want to artificially restrict your attention to say two dimensions, you 
immediately confront exponentially increasing complexity. The combina-
torics become impossibly complex. So, as you say, you get an equation with 
too many variables. This is something I struggle with also in my most recent 
book (Trans: Gender and Race in an Age of Unsettled Identities).  How can one 
talk about the logic of race as a system of classification on the one hand, and 
the logic of sex and gender as a system of classification on the other, since 
race and gender never work independently? Indeed they don’t. Yet at the 
same time they are two distinct systems of classification with quite distinct 
logics, and I think it is useful to consider the systems in relation to one an-
other. Intersectionality is important, but social analysis does not have to be 
always and only intersectional.
Viktor, thank you for your kind words, it is always wonderful to know that 
one’s writing has a certain resonance, that it helps think through problems. 
This is the best any author could hope for – to know that some concepts can 
be put to work! One doesn’t fashion concepts just to fashion concepts; con-
ceptual analysis is useful only if it improves the tools we have for thinking 
through substantive problems. So I appreciated very much your comments 
on the complexities – and I would say the absurdities, the ironies – of the 
internal and external politics of membership and citizenship in the Croatian 
case.  I have one small illustrative discussion that resonates with your com-
ment tucked away at the end of the chapter on “Migration, Membership, and 
the Nation-State.” Here I drew on a much longer empirical piece that I wrote 
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with Jaeeun Kim on the politics of transborder membership and belonging in 
Germany and Korea. We considered ways in which certain potential external 
kin had been considered and defined at various times as actual transborder 
kin by Germany, and how the same thing happened in both North and South 
Korea, in different ways, with respect to potential transborder kin in China, 
in Japan, and in the former Soviet Union. We emphasized that one can’t as-
sume that transborder external kin are just “out there.” Rather, they must be 
constructed, identified, defined, and delimited. Some who are excluded who 
might well have been included, others are included who might well have been 
excluded.  There is a whole labour of construction of the population that is 
then given certain rights and privileges, such as the opportunity to acquire 
citizenship. So I loved your comments on the ironies of the Croatian case.
Jovo, thank you very much for your comments. Let me just address the ques-
tion of why I don’t discuss class in a sustained way in the chapter on “Differ-
ence and Inequality.”  This has to do with the way I set up the question that 
I address in this chapter. I pose a deceptively simple, but in fact quite com-
plex question of how categories of difference, which are not in themselves 
intrinsically linked to inequality, are nonetheless contingently implicated in 
the production and reproduction of inequality.  I do not treat class as a cate-
gory of difference because it is intrinsically, by its very nature, already a cat-
egory of inequality.  So class doesn’t belong alongside citizenship, alongside 
ethnicity, race, sex or gender, or religion, since all of these other categories 
of difference are contingently linked to inequality. You can imagine a world 
of difference without inequality, or a world in which patterns of inequality 
would be entirely independent of categorical differences of, say, ethnicity, 
religion, or gender. You can’t even imagine this about class because it is intrin-
sically a form of inequality. That is why I do not address class in this chapter.
Marko Kovačević
Actually, it is really great to see that many colleagues here had previous ex-
perience with reading Professor Brubaker’s book, and some of them have 
been reading him for one or several decades. I have to say that I have learnt 
about Professor Brubaker’s work by chance two months ago. I come from 
area different area of study, International Relations and International Secu-
rity Studies, and I find this book a good expression of meta-theory that can 
encapsulate certain perspectives, certain notions and concepts that are used 
in International Relations and International Security. My research deals with 
topics such as state building, Europeanization, and identities of post-Yugo-
slav states. I read this book as a way to give more meaning to certain concepts 
that are employed in the works of some Security Studies’ theorists, most no-
tably those who belong to the so-called Copenhagen School.
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I found the line in your book that refers to the language being the medium 
of politics and communication. This can be related to the Copenhagen School 
and some of the concepts it uses and develops, such as identity, discourses, 
and the theory of securitization as a speech act. That understanding of the 
current developments in social theory more generally – where language is 
the medium through which security is constructed as a speech act sparks in-
terests across the spectrum of social sciences today. Thus, the formative role 
of language in security practices is what we mean by security and is actually 
underscored by securitization theory. So, in my view, this understanding of 
identity language and the ways of difference has key implications for the con-
temporary International Studies. Here I would like to make another interna-
tional security-related remark regarding the idea of modernity, and how it 
can be applied to the discussions of the ways states interact and develop in 
terms of state-building efforts in the 20th and the 21st century. 
The latter is important for certain discussions about how the security dy-
namics reflect on regional levels. In this way, it is important to note that there 
are, in the works of Barry Buzan and his colleagues from the early 1990s, the 
conceptualizations of the pre-modern, modern and postmodern states. If we 
employ that kind of conceptualization of this triad of states – for example, 
from certain pre-modern states in the previous centuries, across the modern 
states that were present in the 20th century, to the postmodern states (i.e. the 
European Union member states, Japan, or the US) – does this understanding 
of modernity as a ‘single modernity’ have any implications for our thinking 
about states? Does this conceptualization of modernity as being one, except 
for its theoretical implications and fruitfulness for further thinking, have any 
implication for thinking about equality and what does that mean in terms of 
International Security Studies?
In this regard, there are some works by the authors who theorize within the 
‘postmodern’ tradition in International Relations, such as Arlene Tickner, 
and who call for thinking about ‘non-Western’ IR theory and practices. My 
question would be whether having this one conception of single modernity, 
does that conception (you mention in the book that there are two compo-
nents of the conception of modernity, one is the core and the other is flexi-
ble) – can we, for example, expect certain implications for the developments 
in Asian and other regionalisms in the world? For example there is ASEAN, 
which is a regional organization of the South-East Asian countries, and there 
are arguments about the differences and conceptions of the ASEAN region-
alism compared to the European Union. This might further imply that the 
conception of modernity can be understood differently in those countries, 
reflecting the quality of their institutions. My second question is about state 
identity, since you also cover the notion of identities, and the differences in 
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identities on the level of individuals and the level of societies. In this sense, 
what would be your opinion on the notion of state identities − is it a viable 
concept today if we go for notions of pluralism? What is the usefulness of 
the concept of state identity today, in your view?
Ivan Đorđević
I will start with one reflection on singular versus multiple modernities. It 
reminds me of similar discussions in anthropology between postmodernity 
and coming back to some kind of positivist approach in ethnography and 
anthropology these days. As I understood, and you will tell me if I am wrong, 
your notion of single modernity here is a criticism of the concept of multi-
ple modernities understood as something which is the consequence of the 
cultural turn in cultural studies or anthropology. I understood this as a cul-
turalisation of politics, where culture became some kind of a core topic for 
human and social studies. But on the other hand, giving voice to indigenous 
people also focused politics on culture and blurred somehow the other kinds 
of inequality. From my point of view, coming back to the concept of single 
modernity gives an opportunity to reconsider these concepts that criticized 
the mid-century concept of modernity. But, on the other hand, if we take the 
notion that multiple modernities concept somehow contested the ideolog-
ical nature of the mid-century concept of modernity, it also, from my point 
of view, became part of the culturalised and deeply ideologised polity which 
could be connected with the concept of the end of history. Or a concept that 
basically promoted new values, values of liberal democracy and market econ-
omy as a main goal of whole societies around the world.
I would also like to mention – you mentioned actually – the adaptability of 
nationalism and the nation state as something which is in the real core of 
nationalism and the nation state. I was thinking about something which is 
relevant within the EU during this period. From one point of view, the EU 
is now something I would call the double-edged politics of belonging. The 
EU now considers itself as an entity that protects itself, protecting its own 
values like human rights, like plenty of different results of identity politics 
during the last decades. Now it is making a kind of a fortress of Europe, pro-
tecting itself like a typical nation state. It builds itself as something which 
is territorialized, and it has its own identity, from the point of view of EU 
members. On the other hand, within the EU, we now have a debate which 
we can call ‘more nation states against more Europe’. The concept of ‘more 
Europe’ is now abandoned, and the concept of the nation state is relevant 
again. Like in Hungary or in other countries of the so-called Visegrad group. 
My question is: is this adaptability of a concept of a nation state that we can 
see within the EU right now – it adapts itself, and is obviously very adaptable 
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as a concept? But on the other hand, other parts of this liberal discourse, like 
this teleological liberal discourse which is connected to the economy, is not 
abandoned at all. If we define the EU as a nation state broadly seen, or we 
define it as a different nation state which is now trying to make a different 
kind of community, there is no debate about the concept of progress. There 
is no mentioning of this kind of inequality, considering inequalities mainly 
in an economic discourse. So, my question is: if this liberal model is aban-
doned, is it possible to think about different economic models within the 
new emerging nation states?
Rogers Brubaker: 
Response to Marko Kovačević and Ivan Đorđević
Regarding the question of single modernity versus multiple modernities, I 
should note that I address this issue in a very short chapter on “Nationalism, 
Ethnicity and Modernity.” This was not framed as a broad-based intervention 
into debates about modernization theory. It addressed a limited and specif-
ic question: if we are talking about nationalism and politicized identity, do 
we need the concept of multiple modernities to make sense of the multi-
ple forms assumed by nationalist politics, politicized ethnicity, indigeneity, 
and so on?  Or is it helpful to think about the development, emergence, and 
worldwide diffusion of a set of models and templates for claims-making as 
part of a single global process, a process that assumes many different forms 
in different times and places, and yet is nevertheless a single process? I favor 
the latter view.  The notion of diffusion may be seen by some as too close-
ly linked to mid-20th century modernization theory, but I think diffusion 
can be understood in a more sophisticated way. What diffuses is not simply 
mechanically taken over from one context and used in another. Diffusion 
proceeds rather through a variety of creative syntheses through which what 
diffuses is melded with a variety of local, indigenous idioms and adapted to 
local circumstances.  This produces a great variety of forms, but that variety 
can be interpreted as a set of variations on a certain core “package,” a certain 
set of basic templates and models. This is what leads me to speak of single 
modernity rather than multiple modernities. 
